

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: TIME FOR A PLAN

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ABSTRACT

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On September 11, 2001, the United States, the last super power, launched a global war on terrorism. This war on terrorism led the United States to Iraq. Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) was the template adopted and the conditions expected. The clearly defined political objective in ODS included a comprehensive end state and the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait. In 1990, the elements of national power were coordinated and applied prior and subsequent to combat operations. However this template had no sequel for the reconstruction or nation building of Iraq. In developing the plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), assumptions and calculations were made often using the experiences and situations encountered in ODS. The political objective set in OIF was translated by the military as "regime change" with little thought to the implied mission of nation building. It has been made apparent that the plan for Iraq's reconstruction was at best, incomplete. A majority of the United States' leadership, both civilian and military, was ill prepared for post-conflict operations. This Strategic Research Project will recount the prior planning prior to OIF, the assumptions and miscalculations, historical lessons learned but forgotten and the challenges that remain in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

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IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: TIME FOR A PLAN

"Resources are needed, a strategy is needed, a plan. American forces should never be committed to battle without a strategic plan. Not only for the fighting but for the aftermath and winning that war. Where are we, the American people, if we accept this level of sacrifice without that level of planning?"

- General Anthony Zinni USMC (retired)
4 September 2003

On September 11, 2001 the world changed forever. The United States, the last super power, entered a global war on terrorism. This war on terrorism led us to Iraq after our overwhelming success in Afghanistan, a military operation unanimously approved by the United Nations. Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) was the template adopted which defined the conditions expected in Iraq. The clearly defined political objective in 1990 was the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait. In 1990, the first three elements of national power: information, economic, and political were applied prior to the use of the fourth element, the military. This ODS template contained no applicable elements for the re-construction or the nation building of Iraq. In developing the plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), assumptions and calculations were often made using many of the experiences and situations encountered in ODS. The military leadership translated the political policy of "regime change" in Iraq as the desired "ends" that could be accomplished solely by the "means" of force. It has become apparent that the plan for Iraq's reconstruction was at best, incomplete. A majority of the United States' leadership, both civilian and military, was ill prepared for post-conflict operations that include insurgency warfare while trying to conduct nation building operations.

Our recent perceived lack of success in post-war Iraq bears study. This paper will first discuss President Clinton's attempt to improve the cooperation between the inter-agencies. Then assumptions and miscalculations made prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will be analyzed to better understand the difficulties encountered once major combat operations had ceased. This will be followed by a recount of the State Department's and the Department of Defense's (DoD) relations in developing, or not developing, the post-war plan. The United States has a history of changing foreign regimes and post-conflict operations. A study of historical lessons learned is warranted since the U.S. has repeated mistakes that should have been learned. It is evident that the world's last super-power, which promotes a new doctrine of pre-emption in its war on terror, has the moral responsibility to also be prepared to be a nation builder. A study of the present challenges and how the elements of national power can best be used to re-construct Iraq warrants analysis.

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE (PDD) 56

The Clinton Administration realized there were problems with interagency cooperation and planning during the Bosnia crisis in 1995. To facilitate the process, President Clinton published Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 in May 1997. This document was designed to be the blueprint for interagency planning for complex contingency operations. The purpose of PDD 56 was to ensure that the proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms would be captured and exercised prior to future conflicts. PDD 56 required the Deputies Committee to establish appropriate interagency working groups to assist in "policy development, planning, and execution of complex operations." The PDD 56 required a political-military implementation plan be developed for coordinating U.S. government actions in complex contingency operations.

"With the use of the pol-mil plan, the interagency can implement effective management practices, namely, to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation. The desired unity of effort among the various agencies that is created through the use of the pol-mil plan contributes to the overall success of these complex operations."¹ National Security Presidential Directive-XX is a draft revision of PDD 56 made by the Bush administration. Unfortunately this NSPD was never signed, promulgated or exercised prior to war in Iraq.² Unfortunately, PDD 56 was not used either.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following planning assumptions were made prior to the United States' commitment to a regime change in Iraq:

1. The United States had won the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people prior to combat operations and the Allied forces would be met by a grateful populace who would embrace them as liberators, not enemies or occupiers.³
2. The removal of Saddam Hussein would remove the threat represented by the Baath Party.⁴
3. Large numbers of the Iraqi army units and Iraqi police would welcome the U.S military and would be in place to assist in the rebuilding of Iraq.⁵
4. The Iraqis would quickly settle their historic religious and tribal differences while embracing democracy.⁶
5. The revenues from the vast oil reserves could be used immediately for financing the rebuilding of Iraq.⁷

6. The post Saddam government would be able to use the intact ministries, bureaucrats, and records that were utilized by Saddam in distributing food and medicine under the U.N. sponsored food for oil sanctions.⁸

MISCALCULATIONS

The civilian and military planners for OIF miscalculated the following prior to forces being deployed to the theater:

1. The United States expected and was prepared for a humanitarian crisis involving mass refugees and food shortages after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.
2. The government and economy of Iraq would still be functioning after the fall of Saddam Hussein.⁹
3. The infrastructure of Iraq would largely be in place after liberation.
4. The Iraqi police force was trained and capable of handling civil unrest.¹⁰
5. The United States and United Kingdom expected greater support from the Shiite South.¹¹
6. The U.S. government, more specifically the DoD, exaggerated the influence and capabilities of the Iraqi National Congress to govern after the regime change.¹²
7. The senior DoD civilians, contrary to the input from their senior military advisors, underestimated the number of U.S. troops required for stability operations.¹³
8. President Bush miscalculated the amount of international support, or lack thereof, for his Iraq policy.
9. The Iraqis would quickly embrace democracy.

THE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PLAN

"Even the ultimate outcome of a war is not to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."

- Clausewitz, *On War*, p.80

Prior to the conclusion of combat operations, during the transition to post-war operations, a strategic plan must be ready to be implemented, a coordinator identified, a lead agency appointed and the appropriate military and civilian forces must be in place to execute a post-conflict reconstruction plan.¹⁴ History has shown that any delay in implementation can have catastrophic results. The coordinator should have full White House backing, should be assigned a deputy to run the public diplomacy campaign, and have responsibility for a post-

conflict task force that draws its membership from across the interagency.¹⁵ Ideally the person chosen to fill this post will have a good standing on Capitol Hill, an extensive working knowledge of the U.S. political process and a strong regional background. The lead agency needs to have a sizable interagency staff, a coherent organizational structure and working relationship with the Combatant Command Staff.¹⁶ This agency must be able to execute the post-war plan as if it was a military campaign battle plan, utilizing all the elements of national power.

The State Department (DoS) began the planning for the re-construction of Iraq called the "Future of Iraq Project" in April 2002 (11 months prior to combat operations). Initially DoS organized over 17 interagency working groups while involving exiled Iraqis to provide expertise and to represent the country's many ethnic and religious factions. These groups analyzed available intelligence and spent millions of dollars drafting strategies about numerous issues including agriculture, the economy, the judicial system, political structure and oil production. Simultaneously, DOS was imploring the help of the Department of Defense. These overtures received a less than enthusiastic reception by the senior leadership of the Defense Department. A lack of cooperation between the DoS and the DoD had been fueled by a disagreement, centered on the future government of Iraq and its leadership in the summer of 2002. The DoD had developed ties with Ahmed Chalabai and the exiled National Congress. The Department of Defense saw a role for Chalabai and his ex-patriots in the new Iraqi government. The State Department and the CIA rejected the idea of Ahmed Chalabai being placed in power predicting that he would be unacceptable to the Iraq citizenry.¹⁷ Despite the lack of contributions by the Defense Department, a 2,500 page-planning document was created by DOS consisting of 13 volumes of recommendations on specific topics plus a one volume summary and overview.¹⁸

In addition to the State Department's "Future of Iraq Project", the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania began postwar planning in mid-October 2002. This research or planning team included representatives from the Army, the Joint Staff and the interagency.¹⁹ The 78-page SSI monograph published in February 2003, co-authored by the SSI team leaders, Mr. Crane and Mr. Terrill provided a detailed outline of recommendations and postwar priorities for rebuilding Iraq.²⁰ The monograph emphasized the United States must be prepared to begin accomplishing these essential tasks listed in its Transition Phase (Phase IV of the OPlan) while "Decisive Operations" are still ongoing. The authors conclude, "The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation's major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace as well."²¹

On January 20, 2003, President Bush signed National Security Directive 24, assigning postwar planning control of Iraq to the Pentagon. At that time, the Defense Department was planning for combat in a linear fashion. The plan called for the vast combat power of the United States to be used to "shock and awe"²² the enemy into complying with the coalition's will. The military staff planners were busy planning for decisive operations. This left the planning for reconstruction up to Mr. Rumsfeld and his small inner circle that included his deputy, Mr. Wolfowitz, and his Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Feith. Ms. Kwiatkowski, a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel who worked for Mr. Feith during this period, remarked, "the failure of the post-war plan is a result of functional isolationism, cross-agency cliques and "Group Think" that surrounded Mr. Rumsfeld and his inner circle." Organizational psychologists warn that this is a dangerous phenomenon that can result in "uncritical acceptance or conformity to prevailing points of view often occurring with a domineering figure in charge."²³ This accounts for the majority of incorrect assumptions and miscalculations that were utilized in developing the postwar construction plan.

In February 2003, the Department of Defense established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) with retired Army LtGen Garner in charge. This organization was to plan for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and civil administration. Prior to the commencement of OIF, ORHA concentrated on signing contracts with American companies interested in profits to be made in Iraq in contrast to developing a multidimensional, well orchestrated plan.²⁴ LtGen Garner initially planned to begin relief and reconstruction efforts as soon as the military secured parts of Iraq. ORHA failed to seize the post-conflict reconstruction initiative by deploying the bulk of its organization to Iraq two weeks after major combat operations had ceased.²⁵ However, in keeping with the regime change focus, the military concentrated on striking at the heart of Saddam's regime by driving straight to Baghdad while rapidly and decisively defeating the Iraqi army enroute. This left insufficient U.S. forces to secure towns in the rear areas and ensure the well being of all Iraqis while fighting for control of Baghdad.

Due to the lack of organization, resources and direction, within weeks after combat operations had ceased, it became evident to U.S. military commanders in Iraq that ORHA alone was not able to handle the reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, LtGen Garner became increasingly frustrated by squabbles among the DoS, the Pentagon and the intelligence community that arose shortly after major combat operations had ceased. Mr. Rumsfeld had failed to build a consensus among the interagency on the Pentagon's role in determining the reconstruction policies.²⁶ These disputes revolved around how to erase the power and prestige

of Saddam's Baath party, how to reshape the Iraqi military, and how to create an Iraqi transition political authority.²⁷

LtGen Garner favored "de-Baathification-lite"; wanting to remove only top Baath administrators in the government ministries and abolish those agencies that supported the Baath indoctrination programs. His plan called for the downsizing of the Iraqi army and employing the dismissed army units on public works projects. Apparently LtGen Garner did not have the authority to make decisions without Rumsfeld's approval. Further increasing LtGen Garner's ineffectiveness was his choice of an exile-dominated committee, which had little rapport with the Iraqi people to lead the first appointed Iraqi Provisional Governing Council. LtGen Garner's dismissal came as criticism of U.S. reconstruction efforts mounted while looting and sabotage attacks were increasing.²⁸

The recall of LtGen Garner by Mr. Rumsfeld and the appointment of Ambassador Bremer by President Bush appeared to signal an end to the Pentagon's role as U.S. director of post-Saddam policy. However, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer was instructed to report directly to Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Bremer expanded the de-Baathification efforts begun by LtGen Garner. The new policy mandated an extensive de-Baathification of all party members. This resulted in the removal of anyone who had been associated with the Baath party and was now working for the reconstruction of Iraq. This policy further hampered reconstruction efforts since many of the technically educated Iraqis running the infrastructure of Iraq were Baath party members. Mr. Bremer's most critical mistake was ordering the demobilization of all military and security services, as well as closing the Defense Ministry. This action put 450,000 Iraqis out of work and provided the Iraqi insurgents with a large pool of trained recruits. Mr. Bremer was tasked with establishing law and order, a stable and willing provisional governing authority, and a secure environment where Iraqis could live without fear. It appears that even though being directed to report to Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Bremer, unlike LtGen Garner, had increased authority to make changes without first conferring with the Pentagon. Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Bremer assumed there would be sufficient time and Iraqi support to create democratic institutions establishing a balance of power, the rule of law, separation of mosque and state, increased participation by women in government, and protections for civil and human rights.²⁹

Mr. Rumsfeld and his staff made assumptions and assessments that proved incorrect while failing to develop a detailed plan for post-war Iraq. Furthermore, by alienating the State Department, the DoD inner circle had to recruit its own Iraqi advisors and subject matter experts to investigate the same issues already researched by the State Department. The fragmentation of effort and poor success during transition operations (Phase IV of the OPLAN) resulted in

President Bush assigning Ms. Rice, his National Security Advisor, responsibility for Iraqi reconstruction in September 2003. Critics have viewed this change as President Bush's attempt to mitigate criticism of the administration's postwar progress.³⁰

MILITARY PLANNING AND THE TYRANNY OF TIME

Unlike the civilian leadership in the Defense Department, the Joint Staff, regional Combatant Commands and the U.S. military services have developed organizations extremely adept at meticulously planning for contingencies. The military requirement to maintain detailed plans for countering political-military threats in every strategic region of the world evolved after World War II. These operation plans (OPlans) include preparation, deployment, mission and redeployment of forces down to the individual units. In developing operation plans, assumptions and calculations are made. Intelligence assets are required to constantly verify these assumptions. All operation plans include derivative options that try to account for possible erroneous assumptions or changes in the political objectives. Due to the difficulty in accurately predicting enemy responses, and analyzing intelligence, staff officers often use "worst case scenarios" when developing their plans. Unfortunately, the DoD assumed away many problems the U.S. is facing today and miscalculated Iraqi response in this intervention on their behalf.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires regional commanders to plan for a transition phase to follow a decisive combat operations phase. Unfortunately, this transition phase planning is often neglected. Historically, Combatant Commanders have dedicated their efforts to the "Decisive Operations" planning phase and ignored the "Transition Operations" phase, which includes peace and stability operations. This has led to recent criticism by the media and many politicians, claiming, "the military won the war, but may be losing the peace."

The poor Phase IV execution can be partly attributed to the military's success in emphasizing being able to rapidly and decisively defeat the enemy with minimal forces. Past combat operations required long build up periods while sizable forces deployed to theater. Typically, the military operations took months or years before the enemy negotiated a surrender or an extended ceasefire was established. The protracted conflict allowed time for military planners to focus on the post-conflict phase during the latter phase of decisive operations. Due to overwhelming, rapid military success on the battlefield during OIF, the time allowed for planning and deploying forces best suited for Phase IV operations was compressed. Future civilian and military planners will have to begin detailed coordinated planning prior to deploying forces.

A new planning cell, evolving at the regional commands is the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs). After 11 September 2001, the JIACGs were established primarily to coordinate interagency in conjunction with efforts and the actions of the DoD for the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In future planning for post-conflict reconstruction, this group will be critical for Combatant Commander's staff in planning Transition and Stabilization portions of a campaign plan. The JIACGs will increase the successful interagency coordination planning through increased "communication, cooperation, coordination and cultural sensitivity."³¹

"Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at each combatant command HQ will significantly increase civilian and military coordination and enable a more complete understanding of policy decisions, missions and tasks, and the strategic and operational assessment. They enable collaboration to integrate the capabilities from all instruments of national power to more effectively achieve the desired end-state. The tools and relationships necessary to enable such coordination must be established before a crisis unfolds."

- Joint Operations Concepts, JCS Version 1.0 for 2003
Signed by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld³²

HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED BUT FORGOTTEN

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

- George Santayana
Life of Reason, Reason in Common Sense
Scribner's, 1905, page 284

The United States has been involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts beginning with the end of the American Civil War. This country's post-war experiences should have provided civilian and military planners a "lessons learned" departure point for the planning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Reconstruction operations conducted in the Philippines, Germany, Panama, Haiti and the Balkans should have taught us many of the lessons we are re-learning in Iraq.

PHILIPPINES

At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898 the United States began a long occupation of the Philippines that officially ended with the Philippine Independence in 1946. One of the earliest lessons learned from this experience is that post-conflict operations are misnamed. These operations, commonly referred to as "Transition Operations", need to be conducted simultaneously while combat operations are ongoing. Additionally, "Transition

Operations" must be planned in detail before combat operations begin. Finally, military forces must be ready to accomplish transition tasks as soon as geographic areas are controlled. In the Philippines, the U.S. Army learned that all soldiers needed to be trained and prepared to accept missions that are normally the purview of civil affairs units.³³

GERMANY

The U.S. Army has received accolades for its execution of the Marshall Plan in post World War II Germany. This success was largely due to the capitalization on the experiences of the Army in post World War I Germany and the early planning done in 1942. In preparation for the postwar German reconstruction, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia in the spring of 1942. The students gained valuable insights in preparation for Phase IV operations in which they included the requirement for civil affairs units to follow two to three days behind combat units. These units were trained for the vetting of former Nazi party members. The *Fragebogen* (a questionnaire) was prepared prior to Transition Operations to help determine which Nazis had held leadership positions, committed war crimes, or could not be trusted. However, those who were deemed minor Nazi party members were retained for their skills in managing or running the infrastructure and the government being created. Moreover, local elections for town mayors and councils facilitated the "nation building" process by shifting the responsibility for reconstruction from the U.S. Army to the elected officials. The national government was only established after the state governments were working effectively. To measure effectiveness, public opinion polls were taken often to gauge the German attitudes and concerns.³⁴

PANAMA

Operation JUST CAUSE was a textbook operation demonstrating the ability of the American military to quickly and decisively defeat an enemy. On the other hand, the post-conflict or Phase IV operations did not go as well. The XVIII Airborne Corps was responsible for most of the planning for Operation JUST CAUSE. Military planners at the Corps level concentrated on Phase III, Decisive Operations. The majority of the military forces deployed to the theater were neither prepared nor trained for post-conflict operations. The operation called for attaching only one Military Police Battalion (800 personnel) in the force list (a table of military units designed for the operation), to handle running a detention facility, providing security for key facilities and all convoys, and to restore order during the civil rioting that followed combat operations. Additionally, the planned number of civil affairs personnel and engineers were

insufficient for the reconstruction missions assigned. The interagency cooperation was also poor, with many agencies being excluded from the DoD planning. Finally, the State Department left the embassy understaffed which further frustrated post-conflict coordination between the DoD and other government agencies. According to Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, "senior commanders admitted afterward that they had done poorly in planning for post-conflict operations and hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future."³⁵

HAITI

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an example of military and civilian planners applying lessons learned from their experiences in Panama. On April 1, 1993 JCS sent an alert order to Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command to begin planning for operations in Haiti. Forces were not deployed until September 1994. This considerably long lead-time between the crisis and actual military intervention facilitated the planning process. The Haiti Planning Group, with the assistance of other government agencies, developed a detailed "Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services." The planned deployment of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade was the first time since World War II that the U.S. Army had committed itself to a large-scale civil administration. Additionally, the army roles and missions expanded during the restoration effort from security and stabilization operations to reconstruction operations. The military received praise for its performance in Haiti, but without long-term military involvement, most U.S. civilian reconstruction goals for Haiti have been unattainable. One key lesson of this frustrating experience is that the redeployment of military forces should be predicated on measurements of success rather than a timetable. Additionally, the civilian agencies that take over reconstruction operations must be capable of maintaining the original objectives as well as achieving newly assigned ones.³⁶

BALKANS

Current operations in the Balkans reinforce the lesson that mission and force requirements change during the post-conflict phase. The mission has evolved from security operations to enhancing long-term stability. Combat forces are best suited for security operations while civil affairs units are designed for peace and stability operations. U.S. military leaders in the theater realized they had moved into the area of nation building without the necessary number of civil affairs units to handle this newly assigned mission. As the situation in the Balkans evolved the requirement for combat troops lessened while the need for engineers, military police, intelligence officers and civil affairs personnel increased.³⁷

HISTORY'S LESSONS

Historically, the United States has been involved in regime changes and the inherent reconstruction operations that follow. Our successes and failures should have taught the following:

1. There is a requirement to develop an early, comprehensive OPLAN that includes the interagency players as planners and executors. This plan should establish essential tasks, responsible agencies and military forces required for execution. It also needs to be complete and rehearsed prior to the commencement of combat operations. To gauge success, measures of effectiveness should be identified prior to commencement of transition operations.
2. The U.S. Army should develop a force that deploys for combat operations with forces which are trained and capable of simultaneously conducting transition operations.
3. Units following in trace of combat units must be tasked and trained for the vetting of former "enemies." These former "enemies" can be critical to reconstruction efforts and the building of a nation.
4. The order of priority for completion of transition operations should be: security and stabilization, regime vetting, establishing the "rule of law" and building the foundations of a democracy prior to the redeployment of U.S. military forces. It must be understood that the essential tasks of transition operations will occur in secure regions often simultaneously as combat operations are being executed in other regions of the country.

CHALLENGES

The U.S., after a nearly one year occupation of Iraq, finds that many of the original challenges remain, namely security and stabilization, establishing the "rule of law" and building a viable democracy. The situation has been aggravated by the fact that strategic planners made incorrect assumptions and miscalculations. Security and stabilization operations for the U.S. led coalition have not gone as well as planned and have been frustrated by a "Cult of Saddam" and the Baath party. The outlawed Baath party has further hampered efforts to establish the rule of law, an effective and functioning judiciary system as well as building a democracy. A sound Iraqi economy will enhance stabilization efforts in the country and the region. International support will greatly improve the U. S. efforts in rebuilding Iraq. Finally, the administration needs to define an acceptable end-state that can be sold to the American public and the international community.

THE MILITARY

"They were very proud that they didn't have the kind of numbers my plan had called for. The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos---this was all foreseeable."

- General Anthony Zinni USMC (retired)
Interview with James Farrow
January 2004

The U.S. Army is presently in the throes of transformation while executing "nation building" in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has been pressuring the U.S Army into becoming a highly mobile and light force to meet the threats of the 21st century. However, the need for the military to become better prepared for conflict termination and nation building is as important to its future as transforming to a lighter more mobile force. The United States military has historically despised peacemaking and nation building and has always felt those missions are diversions from the primary focus of fighting. "As a result, U.S. military thinking tends to focus on winning the war rather than winning the peace, although defeat of the enemy in battle is pointless unless it results in a successful grand strategic outcome."³⁸ The U.S. Army needs to transform a part of its force structure into units that are capable of security and stabilization operations with skills in languages, civil affairs, engineering, police functions, humanitarian assistance, and nation building.³⁹

A stable and secure Iraq is the first challenge that must be met in post-conflict operations. General Shinseki calculated that it would require hundreds of thousands of troops for stability operations in Iraq. Without this increased security, the prophecies of our critics might become reality and we will find that the U.S. has failed again in its post-conflict endeavors. Furthermore, without sufficient forces, terror attacks will continue against civilians, the United Nation's personnel, the International Red Cross officials, officials of governments assisting the U.S. and Iraqis suspected of collaborating with coalition forces.⁴⁰ This may either require the U.S., or preferably other allied forces, to increase the number of its troops.

After security and stabilization, rebuilding the Iraqi army will be one of the "essential tasks" required of the U.S. military. The Iraqi army was one of that country's most respected institutions. The Iraqi army can be critical as a guarantor of peace and stability if it is retrained for constabulary duty and internal security missions.⁴¹ Furthermore, a stable non-political Iraqi army will serve well as a measure of effectiveness.

Finally, the U.S. forces need to change the "occupational force" image. This can be done in a manner similar to the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) tactics that were so successfully

used by the Marines in Vietnam against counter-insurgency forces. Presently, the U.S. Army builds sandbag fortresses isolating themselves from the Iraqi population and making themselves easy targets. The CAP program would combine an American platoon with an Iraq platoon. This combined force is garrisoned inside towns they patrol and secure. The close working relationship between the CAP members improves communication and coordination. Experiences in Vietnam show that using the CAP program greatly reduced insurgent activities in areas they patrol and secure. Additionally, the State Department should apply diplomatic “arm twisting” to U.S. friendly Arab nations to provide substantial peacekeeping forces. This will facilitate changing the image of the occupational forces from “crusaders” to “Muslim brothers”.

THE “CULT OF SADAM” AND DE-BAATHIFICATION

The Baath regime may be out of power, but many Iraqis still think as they were taught to think by Saddam: “the United States is the enemy and helping the occupation forces is unpatriotic.” The Baath Party still represents capability, influence, and elitism.⁴² It is understood by most that there would be a de-Baathification process, but the reality of its impact or method of execution was not addressed by U.S. civilian or military planners prior to the cessation of combat operations. It is important to carefully identify those who committed crimes and acts of terror in their ruthless pursuit of Saddam’s goals. The crimes committed were too horrific, the abuses too pervasive to be excused in the name of reconciliation or appeasement. However, the removal of all Iraqis who were Baath party members will not increase the state of security. If the “de-Baathification” process cuts too deeply, it could result in a mass exodus of the skilled, educated, professional Iraqis whose services are required to build a new republic. Unintended consequences could include collapsed education, legal, healthcare, security, transportation, and sanitation systems.⁴³

RULE OF LAW

The re-establishment of the rule of law is an integral part of the security and stability operations after a regime change. An often-overlooked post-conflict task is the rebuilding of the judiciary system. Neglecting to correctly create a new judiciary system will undermine police reform and public support. U.S. administrators must work with Iraqis while providing the technical expertise for rebuilding the court system, revamping the legal code and developing and assessing the skills of judges and prosecutors. By maximizing the participation of Iraqis, a new trust and confidence in the judicial system will be built. It is imperative that any corruption or criminal activity by the courts or police force be punished swiftly and publicly by an Iraqi

judiciary system. This will increase the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people in an institution that was feared for its “horrific human rights violations” under the previous regime.⁴⁴

BUILDING A DEMOCRACY

An enormous challenge for the U.S. and Iraq will be building a stable democratic Arab republic in a region noted for the absence of sound and constitutional democracies. Fostering democracy is a recent United States policy focus. Previously, the United States supported stable governments in the region regardless of the fact they were mostly autocracies. The requirement for an uninterrupted flow of oil made previous administrations see the value of accepting the status quo. The United States and its allies favored stability over the uncertainty of democratization.⁴⁵ President Bush provided evidence of this policy change when he stated in November 2003, “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.” Nations that are in the infancy of building a democracy are more prone to instability. To build a stable democracy, it will require the United States to guarantee an improved quality of life and economy, a fair and equitable legal system and an accessible education system.⁴⁶

The U.S. must quickly empower the Iraqis. The new Iraqi government needs to be seen as the one making decisions on governance, education, justice and civil society. If the Iraqis are not included in the decision process they will not be “wedded to its success.”⁴⁷ The earlier general elections can occur, the better. However, these elections should not be tied to the completion of a written approved constitution. The U.S. constitution was “a work in progress” and we should not expect Iraq to evolve immediately into a perfect constitutional government. The Iraqis will eventually choose their form of government and write the governing documents. If the United States is to persevere in developing a democracy in Iraq, a long-term commitment will be required. President Bush noted himself that “working democracies always need time to develop – as did our own.”⁴⁸

ECONOMY

The economic challenges for Iraq are threefold. Iraq needs to: rebuild its oil industry, create a domestic economy and eliminate its enormous foreign debt. The sole source of funding for Saddam’s regime was oil production. The present oil pumping and refinery infrastructure has been ravaged by 12 years of neglect and repeated terror attacks. The challenge is to rapidly rebuild the oil industry infrastructure while hiring many unemployed Iraqis.

Returning to pre-1990 oil production levels is crucial for creating a viable and stable economy in Iraq. Prior to OIF, 60% of Iraqis received government provided welfare for their basic needs. Critical to establishing a domestic economy is for the Iraqis with U.S. assistance to establish a banking system prepared to provide low interest rate loans for small businesses. Traditionally, Iraq had an agrarian domestic economy, which deteriorated through the neglect of Saddam Hussein's regime. Agricultural infrastructure and farm equipment need to be revitalized and replaced. Finally, one of Saddam's remaining legacies is the large debt owed to Western nations. In order for Iraq to rapidly rebuild its oil industry and create a domestic economy, the U.S needs to help Iraq renegotiate its foreign debt burden.

A result of the destruction of the Saddam regime has been the elimination of public service institutions which placed thousands of Iraqis out of work. Critical to the Iraq economy is getting demobilized Iraqi soldiers and bureaucrats back to work.⁴⁹. This will require the U.S. to re-organize the institutions responsible for public works, improving the infrastructure and employing the large Iraqi work force. The good news is the Iraqi economy is showing signs of improvement.⁵⁰

MARKETING CAMPAIGN

The U.S. needs to present Iraqi stabilization efforts in a positive light. Recent intelligence predicts that the resentment of the Iraqi people may become a more formidable foe if the populace does not perceive improvements. A venue and plan to disseminate the positive aspects of events in Iraq needs to be developed. President Bush made a good start when he detailed the progress in Iraq to the U.S. public on September 11, 2003. The government of a culture renowned for its ability to "sell ice to Eskimos" must develop a way to present the positive reconstructive efforts in Iraq in a better light.⁵¹

Despite all the disappointments of the occupation, there has been little change in the view of Iraqis. They had craved and deserved liberation from Saddam's brutal regime. The Iraqis could become disheartened about the perceived failings of the occupation administration led by L. Paul Bremer III, which fall far short of the American efficiencies that were an Iraqi standard. They mock most of the handpicked Iraqi leaders who form the transition governing council, saying they spend most of their time abroad on expense-paid trips or maneuvering against one another when they are home. Judging by the most recent poll conducted by the Gallup Organization, all is not going well with the reconstruction. Forty-seven percent of the 1,178 Iraqis polled felt they were worse off than before the war. High on the list of dissatisfaction is the humiliation of finding themselves once again subject to foreign rule, being ordered around

by a foreigner with a gun, who knows nothing of the language and little about their culture. A sign of hope was the response of sixty-seven percent of Iraqis who believed that the country would be a better place to live in 5 years. Even skeptical Iraqis are acknowledging that some things have improved.⁵²

The American public has always disliked the use of its taxes for foreign operations. Equally distasteful has been the committing of troops to an ill-defined cause. The benefits of reconstructing Iraq must be presented in a way that the American public can see that U.S. gains out weigh U.S. costs. Signs of the Bush administration doing this occurred September 14, 2003, when senior civilian and military officials were dispatched to cover the Sunday morning talk show circuit.⁵³

Part of the marketing campaign should be a vigorous information campaign to convince the international community that this pre-emptive war was conducted from necessity. The United States is operating in the world's interest not for its own self-interest. As long as Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the threat posed by Saddam's regime, there will be no common strategy for rebuilding a democratic Iraq. Europeans think the United States exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam's regime and most Americans think the Europeans didn't take those dangers seriously enough.⁵⁴ An effective information campaign must convince the Iraqi people, the citizens of the region and the international community of the improved standards of living in a more open society in post-Saddam Iraq. This approach will help deflate local criticism in the region and help deny terrorists and extremists the ability to use the military action to their own political advantage.⁵⁵

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

A key to the diplomatic efforts for recruiting international support is increasing the speed of the restoration of Iraqi self-government. The Coalition Provisional Authority, a legitimate, internationally recognized government, needs to rapidly develop a functioning, albeit not a perfect, constitution and have general elections. This will reinforce the American position that we came as liberators and not conquerors. It will show the international community that the U.S. did not start this war in order to control or "steal" the Iraqi oil.

Our detention policy in Iraq alienates countries whose help we seek. The international community feels are holding thousands of Iraqis in detention, many for unclear reasons. Amir al-Saadi, science adviser to Saddam Hussein, is being held, purportedly to interrogate him about weapons of mass destruction.⁵⁶ The U.S. needs to turn over these prisoners to the Iraqi

judicial system, further reinforcing our position that the liberated Iraqis will pass judgment on their criminals.

The United States needs to continue softening its resistance to increased United Nations involvement. The civilian and military planners never estimated the cost of reconstruction. The U.S. is finding that “nation building” is very expensive. It is important that the United Nations understand that if we fail in Iraq, the international community will be threatened by the failed Iraqi state that will emerge. It is imperative that the State Department recruit further support from the United Nations in the form of troops and funding.

DEFINING AN END-STATE

The United States has done a lackluster job of defining its political-military strategic goals. This is evidenced by failures in Haiti and limited successes in Panama, Bosnia and Kosovo. The US Joint Publication 5-001 states that the armed forces of the United States should not be committed prior to the National Command Authority’s clearly defining the envisioned end-state. It is a recognized tendency of political leaders to make political objectives broad and sometimes un-definable. These non-rigid objectives allow politicians “wiggle room” when it is determined by the U.S. public that the costs are too high.⁵⁷ The military planners who designed the operational plan for creating an Iraqi regime change did not look beyond the implied objective of regime change. Additionally, the reality of warfare is that the objective or the end-state will change as the conflict progresses and the political- military situation changes.⁵⁸ General Wesley Clark reported it was more than a month into the air campaign against the Serbs before the NATO alliance vocalized the political objectives. He noted that the end-state and the political objectives are often obscured. He described this “fog of war” as a characteristic of modern war.⁵⁹ Two senior Army generals who commanded during OIF admitted that they did not understand that they were required to do “nation building” in Iraq after combat operations ceased. They understood the end-state to be “the defeat of the Iraqi army and the removal of Saddam.” They claimed they saw the Phase IV plan, but characterized it as “sketchy and un-resourced.”⁶⁰ The Administration’s vision, although often poorly stated, was to create a stable democratic Middle-Eastern state friendly to the United States.

CONCLUSION

If there ever was any doubt the United States is in the regime-change business, OIF should dispel it. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has directly or indirectly, deposed the regime of a foreign state roughly once every three years. Those who practice

regime change incur certain responsibilities as well as moral and political consequences. The United States must stabilize Iraq, lest it incur a significant setback in its efforts to make progress in the war against anti-Western Islamic regimes and radical Islamic terrorist movements. Success, however, will likely involve a protracted occupation of Islamic states (i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq) and exact substantial human and material costs. This means the U.S. military's preference to do what it does best --- defeat enemy forces in the field and then quickly depart --- must be overcome. The practice of crafting quick exit strategies must yield to a willingness to develop a comprehensive strategy for winning both the war and the post-conflict period. In short, the American military --- the Army, in particular --- must create a significant capability for conducting stability operations.⁶¹

It is likely the United States will engage in another preemptive war that will require this nation to rebuild the conquered country. It is imperative that a comprehensive plan is developed prior to combat operations that includes conflict termination, post-conflict peace operations, and conflict resolution.⁶² Military and civilian planners have often treated conflict termination as an afterthought. The costs of not looking beyond the immediate victory on the battlefield can no longer be shouldered or accepted by the American taxpayer. As General Zinni stated, "we must have a strategic plan before committing forces to the field."⁶³ Success in the re-construction of Iraq depends on the military and civilian leadership rapidly developing a supportable comprehensive plan that synchronizes the elements of national power (military, political, economic, information/technology). During the transition to post-war operations, a strategic plan must be ready to be implemented, a coordinator identified, and a lead agency is provided with the resources, both civilian and military, to implement it.

WORD COUNT= 7,254

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